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IWASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
control, and the fact that the loan was secured by separate property
would not be enough to establish it as having the character of a
separate obligation, if the holding of the Auernheimer case' is to be
followed.
A method the court might successfully have employed in tracing
the note to the separate property would have been to show that the
bank, in making the loan to Mr. Bubb, was relying directly on the
security of the stock and not on the credit of Mr. Bubb, either as an
individual or as a member of the marital community. The fact that
the stock was his separate property undoubtedly would have led the
court to conclude that the bank loan was a separate obligation and
therefore, since that separate obligation was the source of the loan
to the step-daughter, her promissory note would also be his separate
property.
Assuming that the note was, in fact, the separate property of the
deceased, the solution of the court would be correct. The question
demains, what are the underlying bases for the conclusion that the
note was separate property? The answer is not apparent in the
opinion. RICHARD W. SHELTON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Court Interpretation of the Power to Amend the Initiative. In
State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers' the court held that the legislature's
power to amend an initiative measure adopted by the electorate was
"unlimited" and included the power to repeal sections of the act, "to
alter, modify, take away or add to" the initiative "in such manner as
it saw fit," provided the "subject matter" remained the same.
As a result of the legislature's failure to apportion and redistrict the
membership of the state legislature since 1901,2 the people did so by
adopting initiative 199 at the 1956 general election.' Subsequently,
the legislature at the 1957 regular session apportioned and redistricted
by a different method in the form of chapter 289, an "amendment" to
initiative 199."
Both initiative 199 and chapter 289 were enacted in compliance
with that portion of article 2, section 3, of the state constitution which
'177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934).
'51 Wn.2d 454, 464, 319 P.2d 828 (1957).
2 Laws of 1901, c. 60, at 79.
3 Laws of 1957, c. 5 at 11.
4 Laws of 1957, c. 289, at 147.
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provides that the legislature periodically shall apportion and redistrict
the members of the legislature according to the number of inhabitants
in the state.
Initiative 199 was enacted in accordance with a 1912 amendment
to the state constitution providing for lawmaking power in the people
by the initiative. This amendment provided that no law passed by
initiative "shall be amended or repealed by the legislature within a
period of two years following such enactment."'
The legislature's act claims its validity from a subsequent amend-
ment which altered this two-year limitation.' It provided for "amend-
ment within two years by a vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each house." (Emphasis added.)
The attorney general, acting for the people of Washington, attacked
the constitutionality of the legislature's apportionment act amending
initiative 199. A writ of mandamus was sought compelling the secre-
tary of state, chief election officer of the state,' to perform his duties
in regard to initiative 199. This is the first instance in Washington
that the attorney general has challenged the constitutionality of the
apportionment act;-, yet, the court did not discuss the standing of the
attorney general to sue. An issue of such fundamental importance
deserves mention.
Although there is conflict as to who may attack the validity of an
apportionment, "in any case the attorney general, representing the
interest of the people of the state, has the power."' It is generally
held that the attorney general represents the public and is the proper
party to compel public officers to perform duties owed to the public,
usually through a writ of mandamus.' In accord is a leading Massa-
WASH. CONST. amend. VII (1912). This amendment provided for the initiative
and the referendum. As defined in WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY (2d
ed. 1948) : Initiative, "the procedure or device by which legislation may be introduced
or enacted directly by the people"; Referendum, "The principle or practice of referring
measures passed upon or proposed by the legislative body to the body of voters, or
electorate, for approval or rejection. . . ." Amendment 7 provides that the voters may
propose an initiative by petition. A referendum may be ordered by petition of the
voters or "by the legislature as other bills are enacted."6 WAsH. CoNST. amend. XXVI (1952).
7RCW 29.04.070.
8 A candidate for state senator challenged the constitutionality of an apportionment
act in State ex rel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1916), while an
incumbent senator did so in State ex rel. Christensen v. Hinkle, 169 Wash. 1, 13 P.2d
42 (1932).
D Walter, Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts, 37 ILL. L. RFV. 20 (1942-
1943).
20 Attorney General v. Trustees of Boston Elevated Ry., 319 Mass. 642, 67 N.E.2d
676 (1946). Also see cases cited 5 Am. JUR., Attorney General § 18, p. 248, 249 (1936).
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chusetts case holding that the attorney general is a proper party to
attack the constitutionality of an apportionment act.11
The burden rested upon the attorney general, in attacking the con-
stitutionality of the legislature's act, clearly to establish its invalidity.12
The majority, in a five-to-four decision, held that the act was consti-
tutional. It was not proven to their satisfaction that the legislative
districts formed by the legislature's act were "an arbitrary disregard
of the requirements of the constitution, or so gross and inconsistent as
to imply arbitrary action." 13 They refused to take judicial notice of
the 1950 federal census in order to establish the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of either act because of population changes since
1950. They concluded that, because of the absence of proof of the
number of inhabitants in each legislative district in 1957, and in view
of the general presumption of constitutionality of legislative acts,1 '
either act could be sustained on the ground it apportioned in accord-
ance with article 2, section 3, of the state constitution. In establishing
the limits of its inquiry, the court cited the established rule that:
"Courts will not inquire into a legislative factual determination, be-
yond consideration of that which appears upon the face of the act,
aided by judicial notice." 5
The next attack (the one with which this Note is most concerned)
sought to establish the unconstitutionality of the legislature's act on
the ground that it repealed initiative 199 in violation of amendment
26 of the state constitution providing for amendments only, within
two years of an initiative's adoption.
The meat of this argument was that the substitution of a redistrict-
ing based upon precinct boundaries for the method of redistricting by
census tracts established by section 56 of initiative 199, was a radical
change that amounted to repeal.
Only ten out of a total of fifty-eight sections remained unchanged.
But the majority held that, although the legislature's act did repeal
section 56, it constituted an amendment within the meaning of the
word amend which they adopted, stating:
Since [the legislature's act] chapter 289 deals with the same subject
matter as that contained in initiative 199, namely, redistricting, the
11 Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 244 Mass. 598, 113
N.E. 581 (1916).
12 Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949).Is State ex rel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1916).
"4The presumption of constitutionality applies to apportionment acts in the same
manner as it does to other acts. See note 8, sup ra.
15Saeex rel. Malmo v. Case, 25 Wn.2d 118, 169 P.2d 623 (1946).
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legislature had the unlimited power to establish methods of redistrict-
ing, and to alter, modify, take away, add to, or change the various dis-
tricts in such manner as it saw fit.18
The strong dissent deserves full consideration. The minority agreed
with the attorney general that the legislature's act was an unconstitu-
tional repeal of initiative 199. They also felt it was unconstitutional
because "any districting and apportionment based upon election pre-
cincts... fails to meet the constitutional requirements of Art. II, §
3." 17 They based the latter argument upon the proposition that any
such method must of necessity be based upon the federal census of
1940, since there was no more recent enumeration of inhabitants by
precincts of which the court could take judicial note. The result then
followed that any apportionment based upon a census eighteen years
old could not meet the test of constitutionality."'
The minority, in holding the legislature's act to be an unconstitu-
tional repeal of initiative 199, adopted the words of the court in a
prior consideration of the people's initiative power: "Such provisions
are to be liberally construed, to the end that these popular legislative
rights of the people reserved in the several constitutions where found
may be preserved and rendered effective." '9
The minority relied upon article 2, section 1 of the state constitu-
tion, which, in granting the initiative power, provided that "legislation
may be enacted especially to facilitate its operation." They cited a
prior opinion of the court to the effect that:
There is strongly suggested, in the language of the constitution and
this law, a required liberal construction, to the end that this constitu-
tional right of the people the initiative may be facilitated, and not ham-
"' State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn.2d 454, 464, 319 P2d 828 (1957).
Judge Ott made the following statement at page 462 in reference to the title to the
legislature's act: "Does chapter 289, Laws of 1957, amend initiative?
In the ttile to chapter 289, the legislature used the words, "... . amending section 4,
... and 58, chapter 5, Laws of 1957; ..." From the title of the act, it would appear
that the legislature intended only to amend." (Emphasis added.)
Judge Weaver in his dissenting opinion at page 479 referred to the title of the legis-
lature's act in the following manner: "In all respects, except one, Laws of 1957, chap-
ter 289, purports to be a legislative amendment of initiative No. 199."
In the title to chapter 289, the legislature used the words: .... amending sections
4... and 58 chapter 5, Laws of 1957; and repealing sections 56 of said chapter."judge Otts statement of legislative intent as determined from the title of the legis-
lature's act loses its force when the title is viewed more in its entirety, as did Judge
Weaver.
27 Id. at 483.
28 The legislature must apportion and redistrict according to the number of in-
habitants. WASH. CoNsT. art. II, § 6.
19 State ex rel. Howell v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 569, 166 Pac. 1126 (1917).
1959)
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pered by either technical statutory provisions or technical construction
thereof .... 20
The majority opinion as to this issue was founded upon a different
line of reasoning from that of the dissent. The majority concluded
that the rights of the people were adequately protected by the require-
ment that the initiative could be amended only by a two-thirds vote
of all of the- members elected to each house. Upon this basis they then
applied the ordinary meaning to amendment with the result stated
above. Support for this view is found in a North Dakota decision
which interpreted that state's initiative power.2 ' The North Dakota
constitution provided that no initiative measure "shall be repealed or
amended by the legislature, except upon a... vote.., of two-thirds
of all the members elected to each house." 22 (Emphasis added.) That
court's opinion as to the scope of an amendment to an initiative meas-
ure conforms with that of the majority in State ex rel. O'Connell v.
Meyers. The minority in the principal case made no mention of the
two-thirds vote requirement as protecting this fundamental right but
based their argument upon the purpose behind the initiative. No more
appropriate words can be found to sum up the argument of the dissent
than the following quotation from their opinion. "This case sounds
in fundamentals, not in definitions." 2
State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers is significant in that it is the first
judicial construction of amendment 7 of the state constitution, as
amended by amendment 26, granting the power to amend an initiative
measure within two years of its adoption. Added to this is the fact
that the legislature sought to amend an initiative apportioning and
redistricting the seats in the state legislature. Because of its nature,
it involved political considerations, which in turn were accompanied
by public interest and strong feelings by those for and against such
a measure.
2 4
The political nature of the question determined tended to over-
shadow the basic question involved: the legality of an amendment to
an initiative act. The natural tendency is to regard this decision as a
legal determination of a political question. This is not the case. The
20 Originally cited in State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 Pac.
46 (1914).
21 State ex rel. Strutz v. Baker, 71 N.D. 153, 299 N.W. 574.
22 N.D. CONST. 25, as amended by art. 26 of the amendment.
23 This is quotation from State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 Pac.
920 (1919), relating to the right of referendum, cited on page 482 of the principal case.
24 Mention was made of these considerations on page 472 of the dissenting opinion
in the principal case. However, they were not defined nor discussed in detail.
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court has previously held that its review of a legislative act of reap-
portionment in order to determine its constitutionality was a legal
question. "  By contrast, any attempt by a court to compel the legis-
lature to reapportion in accordance with the constitutional mandate
is regarded as "political" and an infringement by the court upon the
doctrine of separation of powers.20  A recent federal decision holds
to the contrary, 7 but that case concerned the legislature of the terri-
tory of Hawaii, and the holding is not binding upon state jurisdic-
tions.2
The majority of jurisdictions hold, as does Washington, that under
state constitutional provisions limiting apportionment and redistrict-
ing, the state legislatures have a certain amount of discretion. But
whether this discretion is abused is a question for the state judiciary. 9
The real significance of the case under examination lies in the
court's interpretation of the extent of the legislature's power to amend
or repeal initiatives and the resultant erosion of the initiative as a
fundamental right of the people. The two-year limitation is, in effect,
removed through the court's interpretation of the amendment clause:
"[W]e must hold that the people, by granting to the legislature the
right to amend, authorized it to change the law completely, within the
realm of the subject matter contained in the act." 11 "Amendment,"
as interpreted, makes the existing prohibition against repeal unneces-
sary, for the power to repeal includes little more than that which is
included in the power to amend.
It is true that, in legal efficacy, both an initiative act and a legisla-
tive act stand upon equal ground.3 But there is a practical difference,
as illustrated most clearly by the subject matter of the particular
initiative in controversy. Initiative 199 gave more proportionate over-
all representation than the legislature's act and was more desirable
from a representative standpoint than the legislature's act. Although
initiative 199 yielded to a "political practicality" measure, it was effec-
25 State cx rel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1916).
20 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 147 (1956).
27 Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (1956) (Hawaii).
2s Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956), aft'd, 352 U.S. 991
(1957).
29 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 14 (1956). Jones v. Freeman, 193 Okla. 554, 146
P2d 564 (1944), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 717 (1944).
30 51 Wn.2d 454, 464, 319 P.2d 828, 836 (1957).
31 State v. Paul, 87 Wash. 83, 151 Pac. 114 (1915) ; Kadderly v. City of Portland,
44 Ore. 118, 75 Pac. 222 (1904).
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tive in that it prompted the legislature to enact a measure incorporat-
ing some of the equating ideas of initiative 199.32
Because of its very nature, the fundamental idea derived from the
initiative is to "facilitate," not "hamper," its operations.3 It should
be noted, however, that in the absence of a constitutional provision
to the contrary, the legislature has power to amend or repeal initiative
measures, for standing alone they do not have any more force and
effect than other legislative acts."
As the holding in State ex ret. O'Connell v. Meyers indicates, caution
is a must when drafting an initiative measure. For, the more radical
a change the measure will make in the existing law, the more likely it
is to effect the status quo of the incumbent members of the legislature,
the greater is the likelihood that the initiative, if adopted, will be
amended at the next regular or special session of the legislature.
GENE G. OLSON
Occupational Tax-Interstate Commerce-Due Process. In the
recent case of Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Washington,1 the Washing-
ton taxes upon manufacturing2 and wholesaling' within the state,
measured by gross receipts,4 survived an attack based upon the com-
merce clause' and the due process clause' of the United States Consti-
tution. Crown Zellerbach Corporation was engaged in manufacturing
and wholesaling within Washington, as well as in other states. It
also operated an executive office in San Francisco as part of its manu-
32 Since the legislature had not apportioned and redistricted since 1901, population
shifts to urban areas resulted in "gross inequalities in representation. The greatest dis-
parity [was] between the 31st district (in King County) which [had] a population of
over 140,000, and the 10th district (in eastern Washington), which [had] a population
of about 18,830. Both districts [had] the same representation in the legislature."
NAT'L MuNic. REv., April, 1956, p. 175. The people, through initiative 199, did what
the legislature had failed to do. Urban areas under initiative 199 gained in repre-
sentation.
The legislature's act restored the boundaries of fifteen districts to pre-initiative 199
status. Seattle Times, March 13, 1957, p. 5, col. 4. However, "As far as King County
is concerned, the substitute redistricting bill ... gives the state's most populous section
the same additional representation, numerically, as was provided by initiative 199."
Seattle Times, Mar. 14, 1957 p. 8, col. 1.
88 State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 Pac. 461 (1914).
s- Luker v. Curtis, 64 Idaho 703, 136 P.2d 978 (1943) ; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 150(1953).
1 152 Wash. Dec. 688, 328 P.2d 884 (1958).
2RCW 82.04240.
3 RCW 82.04.270.
4 The measure of the manufacturing tax is the value of the goods produced, under
RCW 82.04.240, which is determined by the gross proceeds derived from the sale
thereof, under RCW 82.04.040.
5 U.S. CoiCsT. art. I, § 8.
6 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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facturing and wholesaling activities in Washington. When the above
taxes were levied upon Crown Zellerbach Corporation, it contended
that the amount of the gross receipts attributable to operation of the
San Francisco office should be deducted from the measure. The basis
for this contention was that, "if the measure of the tax, whether gross
income, gross proceeds of sale, value of the products, or otherwise, is
in part attributable to the conduct of business activities outside the
state... ," ' then the use of such a measure without apportionment
or deduction of a proportionate amount of the cost of the executive
office would result in a tax on out-of-state or interstate business
activity.' The tax commission, trial court, and Washington Supreme
Court held that there was no need of apportionment. The Washington
Supreme Court based its decision upon its determination that the
only incidents taxed were those portions of manufacturing and whole-
saling carried on in Washington' and that measuring the tax by the
total gross receipts from these local incidents is valid because it "sub-
stantially reflects the value" '0 of the local incidents.
The problem raised by the appellant in the Crown Zellerbach Corp.
case was that, although gross receipts were nominally used only as a
method to measure the tax, they necessarily were the basis for the tax.
If any part of that basis took place outside the territorial jurisdiction
of Washington, that part would have to be excluded from the measure,
since Washington would have no power to tax it. Answers to this
problem have been made under two separate approaches-that of
the economist and that of the United States Supreme Court. Econo-
mists have noted that a particular activity is often included in the bases
of several taxes, resulting in double taxation. The phenomenon is
referred to as "tax pyramiding," "multi-turnover bases," and "over-
lapping bases," among others. The fundamental pattern is quite sim-
ple. The basis of one tax (e.g., the value of the goods extracted, for
an extracting tax) is used again in the basis of another tax (e.g., value
of the same goods when manufactured, for a manufacturing tax) and
7 Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 3, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Washington, 152 Wash.
Dec. 688, 328 P.2d 884 (1958).
8 The formula offered by the appellant was a ratio applied to the gross receipts,
determined by the cost of producing these goods incurred inWashington, as to the
entire cost of producing these goods.
0 152 Wash. Dec. 688, 691, 328 P.2d 884, 886, 888 (1958). The court held that the
incident of the manufacturing tax was only the process of working "raw or partly
wrought materials, into suitable forms for use... ," and the taxpayer did not show
that any part of this process took place outside the state. The court found the inci-
dent of the wholesaling tax to be the sale of goods at wholesale within Washington.
10 Id., at 691, 328 P.2d at 886.
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yet another tax (e.g., gross receipts of the same goods when sold, for
a wholesaling tax)." This may occur in a tax upon manufacturing
when the basis of the tax is the value of the goods produced, if part
of the value of the goods produced is attributable to an out-of-state
activity. By this process, the basis of a tax upon a local activity may
be found to include an out-of-state activity. If the overlapping activity
is included in a tax of another state, a form of double taxation results."
The United States Supreme Court's approach to the problem of
taxation of multi-state businesses is totally dissimilar to the econo-
mists'. The exact position of the Supreme Court is difficult to plot.
The most that can be done in an article as limited as this is to point
out the general reasoning employed by the Court. The first distinc-
tion which is drawn under the commerce clause and the due process
clause of the United States Constitution is between taxes upon gross
receipts and taxes measured by gross receipts. The former is invalid
if the gross receipts are derived from interstate commerce' 3 or out-of-
state activity, 4 unless apportioned so to reflect only the local portion
of the entire activity. 5 However, if gross receipts are used as the
measure of the tax, the Supreme Court has not found the measure
to impose such a burden upon interstate commerce as to invalidate
the tax.' Under the commerce clause, "if the state found an inter-
" SHuLTZ & HAmss, AmERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 520-522 (6th ed. 1954).
32 "There is nothing inherent in the principles of tax jurisdiction to prevent overlap-
ping or duplicating taxation of the same subject by two or more states, so long as ...
each has some basis for taxing the person or thing to be taxed." Peairs, Jr., General
Principles Of Taxation: An Initial Survey, 6 TAx L. Rxv. 267, 279 (1951).
Is Taxes upon gross receipts derived from interstate commerce are invalid because
the tax is considered to be directly upon interstate commerce itself. Philadelphia & S. M.
S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U.S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
Net income taxes have received different treatment. Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 79 S. Ct. 357 (1959) upheld a "state income tax... on that
portion of a foreign corporation's net income earned from and fairly apportioned to
business activities within the taxing State when those activities are exclusively in
furtherance of interstate commerce." Although a tax on gross receipts from interstate
commerce is invalid, a tax upon net income from interstate commerce is not. The net
income tax places only an indirect or remote burden on interstate commerce.
14 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
15 Illinois Cent R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940) ; Central Greyhound Lines,
Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
10 Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890) ; Baltic Mining Co. v.
Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68 (1913) ; American Mfg. Co. v. St Louis, 250 U.S. 459
(1919) ; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) ; Hope Natural Gas
Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250 (1938) ; International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340 (1944) ; International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947). See Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) ; National Leather Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 277 U.S. 413 (1928) ; Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940). See
Barrett, Jr., State Taxation of Interstate Cominerce--"Direct Burdens," "Mlultiple
Burdens," or What Have You? 4 VArN. L. REv. 496, 511 (1951).
[VOL. 34
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state activity which it could make the subject of the tax, there was
nothing to prevent the state from including in the measure of the tax
receipts, income or capital employed not only in local commerce but
in interstate commerce conducted from within the state." 17 The due
process clause prohibits "state taxes on worth or activities which are
constitutionally extra-territorial.""8 However, inclusion of an out-of-
state basis in a measure is not necessarily fatal to the tax if the result
bears a reasonable relation to the subject taxed." Mathematical exact-
ness is not required.2' Even though the result to a particular taxpayer
is harsh, a reasonable relation to the incident taxed may yet be found
by the United States Supreme Court.2
The Washington court in the Crown Zellerbach Corp. case, having
found the incident of the tax to be valid, applied the technique sug-
gested by the United States Supreme Court decisions by declaring
that the measure was valid since it "substantially reflects the value"
of the local incident. Although Crown Zellerbach Corporation showed
a good instance of double taxation by way of the "overlapping basis"
phenomenon, the Washington court was not prepared to rule contrary
to the quite obvious weight of authority. This position is not without
justification. United States Supreme Court cases like American Mfg.
Co. v. St. Louis22 are not easily distinguished from the Crown Zeller-
back Corp. case. These Supreme Court cases definitely rebuked
17 Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 4 TAx L. REv.
95, 101 (1948). Cf. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895) ; Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); International Shoe Co. v.
Shartel, 279 U.S. 429 (1929); Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290
(1922) ; International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947). An interstate
activity may be a valid subject of a tax under the commerce clause if no risk of double
taxation exists, under Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938),
or if it is not a "direct," as opposed to an "indirect," tax on interstate commerce, under
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) ; Barrett, Jr., supra note 16.
Some writers have expressed opinions that a tax might be held invalid because of
the bases in its measure under the commerce clause or the due process clause, but
admit that the cases are contrary. See Barrett, Jr., supra; Strecker, "Local Incidents"
Of Interstate Business, 18 OHio ST. L. J. 69 (1957) ; HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF
INTERsTATE CommeRCE, 113, 114 (1st ed. 1953).
18 Silverstein, Problems of Apportionment In Taxation of Multistate Businesses, 4
TAx L. REv. 207, 208 (1948). Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910) ;
Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
10 Silverstein, supra note 17, at 208; International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S.
416 (1947).
20 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940) ; International Harvester
Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); Cf. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
254 U.S. 113 (1920).2 1 Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939). But see New Jersey Bell
Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930) where the amount was so out of
proportion to its local activity that the tax was held invalid.
22250 U.S. 459 (1919).
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attacks upon the use of gross receipts as a measure of taxes on local
incidents if the amount of the tax bears any reasonable relation to
the value of conducting the local activity. An additional factor is the
difficulty involved in administration of a workable tax system for a
state, ever increasing with the rapid advancement of multi-state busi-
nesses. The aspect of double taxation will always retain an unfavor-
able reception, but a policy of strict prohibition of double taxation
would severely cripple the states' revenue process. The Washington
court merely selected the lesser of the two evils. This dilemna has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, and it has
allowed the states great leeway in levying taxes. 3
The result seems to be that a taxpayer will have to pay what the
legislature deems to assess him for the privilege of engaging in busi-
ness within the state, within some sort of reasonable limit which is
not clearly defined. Unreasonableness will probably be found by a
practical process of deciding whether the measuring device bears a
reasonable relationship to the incident of the tax, rather than by an
academic process of tracing the basis of the tax.
FRANK J. WOODY
Freedom of the Press-Prior Restraint-Procedural Due Process
-Equal Protection-Washington Comic Book Statute. In Adams
v. Hinkle' the court declared void the 1955 Washington legislature's
attempt to regulate the distribution and sale of comic books likely to
affect juvenile delinquency. The statute involved was the "Comic
Book Act,"' which attempted to give the Supervisor of Children and
Youth Services regulatory control of the publication and distribution
of comic books by requiring all publishers and distributors to submit
for the Supervisor's approval copies of comic books they intended to
sell in Washington. It also required wholesalers and retailers to
acquire a license and gave the Supervisor power to refuse, to grant,
or to revoke such licenses for violation of the act. There was a penal
section making violation of the provisions a crime. Newspapers were
exempt from regulation.
Petitioners, wholesale and retail distributors of comic books, brought
suit in the lower court seeking an injunction to prevent the defendant
Supervisor from enforcing the "Comic Book Act" on the grounds that
23 Silverstein, supra note 18, at 208.
1.51 Wn.2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958).
2 RCW 19.18.010-.900.
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it violated the first amendment to the Federal Constitution and
article 1, section 5, of the state constitution as a prior restraint on
the freedom of the press and, because of its vagueness, it denied pro-
cedural due process.
The supreme court, in an opinion by Judge Foster, held the act
void on the following grounds: (1) It amounted to a prior restraint,
(2) it was an invalid use of the police power of the state, (3) it in-
fringed the freedom of the press safeguards of the Washington con-
stitution and of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, (4) the penal provisions were so vague and indefinite as to deny
procedural due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and
(5) it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Historically, ever since John Milton's essay, "Appeal for the Lib-
erty of Unlicensed Printing," the right of publishers to disseminate
new ideas unrestricted by the prevailing or majority view has been
closely guarded. The first amendment to the Federal Constitution
prohibits prior restraint of the press by the federal government, and
this prohibition is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment.' The Washington constitution also prohibits infringe-
ments of freedom of the press.' These prohibitions, however, do not
preclude the federal or state governments from subsequently punish-
ing abuses of these freedoms, but rather prevent advance censorship
of the press.'
Direct attempts to restrict or censor publications by a prior restraint
usually come in the form of an injunction to prevent future publica-
tion' or in the form of license requirements,' such as those found in
the "Comic Book Act."
These methods of regulation have fared poorly with the courts.'
More success has been had with criminal statutes which are designed
to take effect after publication by making it a crime to distribute or
offer for sale specific material.9 But even in this area the courts have
held that only specific types of literature or publications may be regu-
lated. Those types of publication which do not enjoy the protection
3 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
4 Art. I, § 5: "Freedom of Speech-Every person may freely speak, write and pub-
lish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
SEmerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTENP. PROB. 648 (1955).
0 See, e.g. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7 See, e.g. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
8 Emerson, supra, note 5.
9 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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of the first amendment are generally restricted to obscene literature,"0
group libel,1 direct incitement to crime, 2 and publications that would
be harmful to national defense."
The ability of the various state legislatures to prevent publication
of material such as crime comic books, under state police power is
limited by the requirements that such restriction be necessary to pre-
vent a threatened evil and that the legislature have the power to pre-
vent that particular evil. Such legislation is not favored by the pre-
sumption of constitutionality usually afforded legislative enactments.'4
The state has the burden to show that the threatened evil is, or
should be, beyond the pale of unrestricted freedom of the press."
In view of the fact that there is considerable disagreement as to the
effect crime comics have on juvenile delinquency," despite specific
incidents attributed to them,'7 the state would be faced with a monu-
mental task of supplying the necessary evidence to overcome the
burden required by the courts.
Statutes attempting to regulate publications must also be phrased
so as to avoid attack for such vagueness and indefiniteness as deny
the procedural due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment,"
or for overbroadness." These attacks are usually based upon the
failure of the statutes to state the prohibited act in clearly descriptive
terms. When a statute makes criminal that which was not a crime
before, it must be unequivocal." It must also not be so broad as pos-
sibly to include within the prohibited acts others which are innocent."
However, it should be noted that a state court may cure the vagueness
and overbroadness of a statute by interpretation and construction,
10 Ibid.
11 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
"2Washington v. Fox, 71 Wash. 185, 127 Pac. 1111 (1912), aff'd, 236 U.S. 273
(1915).
"3 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
14 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) ; State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39
Wn.2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952) (applying to freedom of religion).
I rJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952) (involving movies). See
also Busey v. District of Columbia, 138 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
"6 Note, 7 STAN. L. Rav. 237, 249-50 (1955).
17Id. at 251.
" Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
19 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
20 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
"1 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). But see Note, Due Process Require-
ments of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 Ha!v. L. RV. 77, 80 (1949), for a more liberal
test.
2Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937).
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and such interpretation will be recognized by the United States
Supreme Court.2
3
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that any regulation must apply equally to all persons similarly situ-
ated. However, the state legislatures are allowed wide discretion in
the selection of the classes of persons to be affected by the specific
legislation. This requirement of equal treatment under the statute
does not apply to the population as a whole, but only to those who
are in a reasonably classified group.24 The legislature, therefore, has
the power to classify and is restricted only to the extent that such
classification may not be clearly arbitrary. 5 By the weight of authority,
such classification is afforded the presumption of constitutionality
usually possessed by legislative enactments, even though the regulation
involved in the statute is not.20
The Washington court, in applying these rules to the "Comic Book
Act," noted that the presumption of constitutionality usually afforded
to legislative enactments does not apply to civil rights cases and that
an act abridging the freedom of the press may not claim the constitu-
tional presumption of validity.'
Pointing out that the requirement of section four of the statute
demands a license before possession with intent to sell, and is there-
fore a prior restraint, the court held the act void under both the
Washington and federal constitutions.
The court held that the act was not a valid exercise of the state's
police power, since it subjected all comic books to the same regula-
tions, whether they were harmful or not, and that it was therefore not
properly restricted to the evil with which it purported to deal. The
court noted the effect of this statue was to censor all comic books, not
only those accessible to minors.
In Butler v. Michigan," the United States Supreme Court held a
similar Michigan statute invalid, stating that the statute was not
reasonably restricted to the evil with which it was said to deal. The
court said:
2 3 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) ; Washington v. Fox, 71 Wash. 185,
127 Pac. 1111 (1912), aff'd, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
24 CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA ANNOTATED 1145
(1952).
25 Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36 (1907).2 Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919); Madden v. Ken-
tucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
27 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
28 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily
curtails one of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has
attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and prog-
ress of a free society.29
The Washington court pointed out that the recent cases of Roth v.
United States"° and Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown applied only to
obscenity, the publication of which is prohibited without exception by
RCW 9.68.010, but that the statute at hand was not concerned with
obscene literature. Beyond prohibiting publication, it made it a crime
"to possess with intent to sell" comic books which were devoted to
publication of "deeds of violent bloodshed,.., so massed as reason-
ably to tend to incite minors to violence or depraved or immoral acts
against the person." In holding such language made the act void for
vagueness, the court cited that portion of the case of Winters v. New
York3 where a similar statute was struck down by the United States
Supreme Court, which held that "a failure of a statute limiting free-
dom of expression to give fair notice of what acts will be punished...
violates an accused's rights under procedural due process and freedom
of speech or press.""
In the only point in which there existed a disagreement among the
court, the majority held that section 3 (4), which exempted news-
papers from the application of the act, was in violation of art. 1, § 12,
of the Washington constitution and of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The
majority quoted from West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,34
which made a distinction between legislation involving first amend-
ment rights and legislation running counter to only fourteenth amend-
ment due process. The majority extended the reasoning of that case
to invalidate the legislature's attempt to regulate comic books but
exempt newspapers, as being a violation of the equal protection clause.
The minority, also citing the Barnette case, pointed out that it is only
when state action is challenged as violative of first amendment rights,
applied through the due process clause, that the presumption of con-
stitutionality is inapplicable. The minority also noted that a similar
29Id. at 383-84.
30 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
33354 U.S. 436 (1957).32333 U.S. 507 (1948).
3 Id. at 509-10.
34319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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classification had been specifically sustained in Mabee v. White Plains
Publishing Co.8"
The court concluded by holding valid the statutorily created pre-
sumption that comic books appealed to minors and also the provision
that this presumption could not be overcome by a declaration that
they were not so intended.
The problem posed by this case is not abstract. Growing juvenile
delinquency has resulted in much legislative consideration of methods
to combat adverse influence on teen-agers.3" While the actual effect
comic books have on the increased crime rate among them is of some
dispute, sociologists are not unanimous in attributing it to crime
comics."
Successful restriction of obscene matter by criminal punishment
has long been a reality. As early as 1878 in the case In the Matter of
Jackson,38 the United States Supreme Court upheld statutes which
condemned possession of obscene literature. However, the amount of
regulation possible has been a question not easily answered.
In Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California," the Supreme
Court upheld criminal statutes prohibiting, in the Roth case, the use
of the mails to transport (federal statue), and, in the Alberts case, the
writing, printing, and publishing of obscene literature (state statute).
It should be noted that in each of these cases the statute made scienter
part of the offense.
In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown," the Court upheld a state civil
statute providing a means by which books might be judged obscene
and be confiiscated and destroyed.
These cases seem to indicate a relaxation or modification of the
former rigid enforcement of the first and fourteenth amendment pro-
hibitions found in the early Supreme Court decisions. In Roth v.
United States, supra, the Court explicitly held that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." "I While
35 327 U.S. 178 (1946).
3 6 CouNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1957, 105-07 (1956).
3 7 Evidence as to the lack of unanimity as to the effect of crime comics may be found
in 7 STAN. L. REv. 237, 249-50 (1955). A list of specific acts induced by, or attributed
to, crime comics will be found in id. at 251.
3s 96 U.S. 727 (1878). A federal statute making use of the mails to distribute
obscene materials a crime was upheld.
3D354 U.S. 476 (1957).
40 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
41354 U.S. 476, at 485 (1957).
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other cases had hinted at such an interpretation, other than in dictum,
no case before had gone this far. 2
Prior to the Roth and Alberts cases, the usual fate of statutes which
attempted to restrict obscene literature was to be declared unconstitu-
tional on the grounds of censorship," prior restraint on the freedom
of the press,"4 vagueness, denial of procedural due process," or as
being overbroad. 6 The California statute involved in the Alberts
case, supra, could have been read as a prior restraint, since it pro-
hibited the publishing of the material in question. But under the
construction placed upon it by the California court, it did not restrain
material until such material was published and found offensive. It
also contained language usually definied as vague. On the question
of vagueness, the Supreme Court stated:
[A] 11 that is required is that the language "conveys sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices .. . ." ... "That there may be marginal
cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a
particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language
too ambiguous to define a criminal offense." 47
The Court also said that the test should be "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 48
The Court approved the addition suggested by the California court
that the above test be applied as to its effect upon thos likely to read
it. Such a standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the
charge of constitutional infirmity.2
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in the Alberts case would sug-
gest a new standard for state action in this field. Referring to obscene
literature, he stated that the state has the power to make printed
words criminal, restricted by the fourteenth amendment "only insofar
as such power is inconsistent with our concepts of 'ordered liberty.'"
He continued:
It seems to me that nothing in the broad and flexible command of
the Due Process Clause forbids California to prosecute one who sells
42 Winters v. New York, 333 .S. 507 (1948).
43 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
44 Ibid.45 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
46 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
4 Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957).
48Id. at 489.
49 Id. at 490.
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books whose dominant tendency might be to "deprave or corrupt" a
reader... I cannot say that its [obscene literature's] suppression
would so interfere with the communication of "ideas" in any proper
sense of that term that it would offend the Due Process Clause." 5 o
The only conclusion to be drawn is that the Washington court has
followed the more conservative line of authority and has not extended
the holdings of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in
the obscene literature field. Whether the same reasoning which is
applied to obscene literature could be applied equally to crime comics
is still open to question. R. TED BOTTIGER
CONTRACTS
Options to Purchase Realty-Manner of Acceptance. In Duprey
v. Donahoe' the plaintiff lessor entered into a lease for a term of two
years which contained an option to purchase the leased premises in
the following language:
[I]n consideration of the payment ... of the sum of $500 heretofore
made, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged... Lessors...
hereby give, grant, and convey to Lessees the right and option to
purchase said real estate at any time within the terms of this lease for
a total purchase price of $12,500 in cash.
On the final day of the term the defendant lessee orally stated to the
plaintiff's agent, "I am exercising my option."
Subsequently the plaintiff's agent communicated to the defendant
the plaintiff's opinion that the defendant had not properly exercised
the option for the reason that it could be exercised only by full pay-
ment of the purchase price within the term of the tenancy.
Upon retention of possession of the premises by the defendant, the
plaintiff commenced an unlawful detainer action to which the
defendant pleaded the exercise of the option and prayed for specific
performance. The trial court found that the lessee had exercised the
option and allowed the parties thirty days within which to deposit
the deed and payment in escrow. Upon appeal the decree was affirmed
in a departmental decision, one judge dissenting.
The majority held that the option failed to provide a particular
';OId. at 501-03. See also Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948), where he contended that the statue in that case merely made
incitement to crime an offense, was sufficiently definite to avoid attack for vagueness,
and that it therefore was well within the police power of the state.
1 152 Wash. Dec. 93, 323 P.2d 903 (1958).
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